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Objectives
This analysis proposes a continuum of self-regulation approaches for the nuclear, radiological sources and other dual-use industries to consider as a means of combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It specifically targets the aforementioned industries in the area of export control and physical protection of individual industry's facilities and material. 1 The paper analyzes several cases of different industries that implemented a self-regulation approach and extracts lessons learned from these cases.
The need for a self-regulation approach among the aforementioned industries results from the nexus between terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, AQ Khan illicit nuclear trade networks and the prerogatives put forward by President Bush in his February 2004 speech, and IAEA Director General, Mohamed Elbaradei's calls for an increased role of the nuclear industry in combating nuclear proliferation serve as triggers for this analysis and proposition. Another motivating factor for creating such an industry organization / program is UNSC Resolution 1540 that calls "…upon all States to…Develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws…" Such pressing need for industry's proactive engagement in combating proliferation includes industry improving its compliance with export control regulations. A recent survey on U.S. Industry 2 Compliance and Export Control conducted by the Center of International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, revealed that out of 120 surveyed companies, nearly 54% of the companies had selfreported violations and nearly 27% had received a warning letter from the US government about violations.
3 More than 81% of the respondents contend that lack of knowledge about export controls was the "most important" or an "important" cause of violations. Overall, industry scored a "C" (76 out of a 100 possible) on an index of "best practices" for export control compliance. 4 Awareness of these shortcomings is the first step in encouraging industry to take a proactive role in improving its compliance with a knowledge of combating proliferation of WMDs. Furthermore, the cost of compliance programs by individual companies is not trivial. The survey found that on average export compliance systems are costly, particularly for smaller exporters that have seen a 340% cost increase from 1985. 5 Great savings could likely be gained by having 1 Nuclear, radiological sources and other dual-use industries generally have some sensitive material, facilities or sources/components that could be coveted by terrorists or profiteers. A self-regulation approach for physical protection of these items would help prevent them from getting on the black market and could potentially create an effective way of securing sensitive items at the source of their design, production, and/or distribution. Note that this paper defines "nuclear" exports as meaning trigger list items that are specified in Part 1 of the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines (IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.6/Part 1, May 2003). "Dual-use" exports refer to items that are specified in Part 2 of the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines; such exporters include a large range of industries (INFCIRC/254/Rev. 5/Part 2, May 2003). 2 The industry surveyed included 120 leading US exporters of strategic munitions and dual-use items. The survey recognizes that this sample of companies is not representative of the universe of more than 200,000 US exporters and that these companies are likely to have much higher standards of compliance than the average, making the statistics even more alarming. an industry-wide organization provide support in this area. This paper outlines a range of selfregulation approaches for industry to consider.
Overview
Several industries have created organizations to promote self-regulation as a means of encouraging best practices among companies within the industry. The proposition of this study is that the nuclear industry has had a history of self-policing and remains in an excellent position to monitor itself (in addition to the standard regulations that government oversees and enforces). A proactive self-regulation approach helps industries identify problems early on, address them in a proper manner without damaging consequences, and consequently grow their business. Any one company within an industry that behaves poorly reflects negatively on the entire industry. The Bhopal disaster in India is an excellent example of this and the chemical industry's creation of Responsible Care.
This paper describes several case studies of industry self-regulation, as a means of determining what lessons learned may be applicable to the nuclear, radiological sources, and dual use industries to stem illicit trade activities and unauthorized transfers. Furthermore, a straw position is presented on what the self-regulation approach could look like. There are two components to this approach: one focuses on export control as a means of combating illicit nuclear trade activities; the other focuses on the physical protection of nuclear materials on site of an industry's facility. Possible incentives and disincentives for these industries to participate are also presented.
Industry Self-Regulation Case Studies
To understand better the drivers and processes behind self-regulation, the team has reviewed four specific industry cases where different industries have adopted self-regulation as an approach: Diamond, Fertilizer, Cement, and Chemical. Appendix A (Table 1 -4) describes in detail the selfregulation approach used in each case, the implementing entity, the incentives for industry to join, the disincentives to join, and some comments on operational issues of the organization or program that is in place. It also lists whether the industry cases are export control related or physical protection of materials related and describes the incident or triggering event that caused the industry to establish an industry-wide organization (generally in the form of an NGO) to monitor activities and encourage best practices. 6 The missions of these organizations range from establishing a code of conduct or ethics to setting an enforceable standard that all participants must follow (and in some cases is audited by a third-party). In other cases, affiliate organizations are partnered with the industry organization. Table 1 is a summary of the four cases reviewed. For each case the industry implementing the self-regulation approach is listed, the program is named, and the institutional approach implemented is provided. The underlying trigger for the Diamond Industry case study was public outcry. Diamonds were being sold by rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments. The UN Security Council passed resolutions against the purchase of these "conflict" diamonds but the industry ignored them by claiming ignorance. International media broadcasted the results of the "Global Witness" report and the public's outrage caused the UN to pass resolutions that called upon the industry to independently establish a certification process to track all diamond purchases. Therefore, in this case the industry formed its own certification program (called the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme) using the approach of a joint government, international industry and civil society initiative to stem the flow of conflict diamonds. The industry implementing entity was/is the World Diamond Council (WDC) but in combination with governments that enforce it and civil society groups that help to monitor implementation and effectiveness. Individual companies had to implement the Kimberley Process if they were stay in business. Much more detail is provided in Appendix A, Table 1 .
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The Fertilizer Industry's triggering events for establishing a self-regulation approach were the bombings that occurred where ammonium nitrate was used as the bomb fuel (e.g., Oklahoma City federal building, Bali night club, World Trade center attack). This industry has three NGOs (international one, European one, and institute). The mission of each is somewhat different and the most relevant is The Fertilizer Institute that established the "American's Security Begins with You" campaign in 2004. However, even the European Fertilizer Manufacturers Association is interested in stricter safety regulations. The approach used with this industry was a private (NGO) / public partnership to establish safety measures regarding ammonium nitrate. The incentives to join these NGOs are numerous ranging from having access to the latest information on safety benchmarking and new technology, having close ties with government officials who influence regulations, working together to influence policy for the entire industry, easily running background checks and allowing only those who run legitimate businesses to sell, purchase, and transport fertilizer. Disincentives include loosing independent decision making and having less influence if you are a small company. The industry feels that they have gained significant public support and more business by taking this proactive step. Again, more detail in presented in Appendix A, Table 2 . 8 The third case, the Cement Industry, is unusual in that it went to a completely separate entityan NGO called the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), to seek advice and council on how to manage their CO 2 emissions and other factors associated with their operations. The industry knew it was one of the greatest industry emitters of CO 2 and wanted to be proactive in evaluating options given global climate change discussions. The WBCSD hired Battelle to conduct the analysis. 9 All of the reporting has been transparent. The industry "they" started out as a few leaders and grew into a group of 16 today that represent two-thirds of the world's production of cement outside of China. There is no government regulation forcing them to better police their operations. There have been numerous incentives for companies to join the Initiative, including speaking with one voice to all their stakeholders to stress their commitment to sustainable development principles (including having several reporting requirements on environmental conditions, public health and worker health and safety, and business performance). Among other requirements, participants of this initiative must publish a statement of business ethics, and develop documented and auditable environmental management systems at all their plants. Disincentives to join the Initiative include the complexity of coordinating and building consensus across global companies and a loss of independent decision making, particularly for some of the smaller companies with less of a voice. However, from interviews conducted with industry representatives, it appears that participants are overall quite pleased with the outcomes from this effort. They feel that they have improved in all areas of sustainable development.
10 Refer to Table 3 in Appendix A for more detail.
The fourth case is the Chemical Industry, which is likely the best known of the self-regulation cases reported. Bhopal was a horrific accident that shook the industry. The existing Chemical Manufacturers Association 11 created Responsible Care in 1985, following the accident, to address concerns about the manufacture, distribution, and use of chemicals. Member companies were (and are) required to implement Responsible Care. Companies that together produce over 85% of all chemicals worldwide (from 46 countries) are members of what is now the International Council of Chemical Associations.
12 Benefits from the program included sharing of best practices that resulted in process improvements and cost reductions, pre-empting threatened regulations, influencing inevitable regulations, avoiding consumer boycotts, and deflecting monitoring and enforcement. Through sharing of information and a rigorous system of checklists, performance indicators and verification procedures, this industry can demonstrate how it has improved its operations including exports. Individual countries' Responsible Care programs are at different stages of development and have different emphases but are monitored and coordinated by the ICCA.
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James Miller, the former Chairman of the FTC has been quoted saying that "Self regulation directly involves the parties who will generally have the best institutional knowledge about the need for action and about the efficacy of various potential actions. Second, self regulation is more flexible, and therefore is less likely to stifle innovation or excessively limit consumer choice." 14 Self regulation is not an end in itself, but combined with necessary government regulations can improve overall performance of the parties.
Proposed Self-Regulation Approach for Export and Physical Security of Materials
There are several possibilities for instituting a self-regulation approach for the nuclear, radiological sources, and dual-use industries. For the nuclear industry, one of the existing nuclear NGOs could be approached to determine its interest in this mission (see Appendix B for 10 The author, Gretchen Hund, participated in this three-year Battelle study for the WBCSD. 11 CMA changed its name to the International Council of Chemical Associations. 12 The website for the ICCA is www.ICCA-chem.org. 13 Ibid. 14 Miller, James, "The FTC and Voluntary Standards: Maximizing the Net Benefits of Self-Regulation." White House Conference on Association Self Regulation, Washington, DC, Oct. 3, 1984. a full description of these NGOs). Given that the need is to regulate the whole nuclear fuel cycle, with greatest concerns around enrichment and reprocessing, some partnership of existing NGOs might be necessary to address the need. A first step in vetting the concept may be to meet with a few nuclear industry leaders to determine their interest in a self-regulation program. 15 For the radiological sources industry, there is no one NGO given the various applications of sources. It may be possible to leverage existing industry organizations for the most prevalent use of sealed sources (e.g., medical imaging and well-logging) to determine their interest in such a program. 16 The most difficult "industry" to investigate is the dual-use "industries" because of the diversity. Again, individual industries, such as lasers, may have industry organizations that could be approached. Table 2 outlines a number of incentives and disincentives for the nuclear, radiological, and dual-use industries to participate in such a program. The nuclear, radiological sources, and dual-use industries can take many different approaches in implementing a self-regulation program. The approaches are not mutually exclusive, not comprehensive, and generally expand from easier to implement to more difficult to implement (possibly short-term to more long-term options). The continuum in Figure 1 displays a possible range of options that these industries could pursue. The options range from the easier to implement such as Code of Conduct or Ethics that could serve as an ethical guidance around export control and protection of sensitive commodities on site to a more sophisticated approach involving a formalized system of governance and institutionalized procedures and accountability. Initially, the industry could establish the easiest to implement (e.g., Code of Conduct or Ethics) and eventually opt to move to the right on the continuum and implement a more enforceable structure, with explicit procedures, reporting mechanisms 18 , internal auditing, and certification 19 with third party verification. With respect to export control, a specific option is that the industry organization could establish a clearinghouse on export recipients that could help "green lane" exports to approved recipients. This database could be shared with relevant government bodies in some form of a partnership as a means to showcase the industry's transparency and commitment. As illustrated in Table 2 , government partnership will likely further the programs' impact and can be included to varying levels of degree along the entire continuum. It must be noted that guidance via an ISO standard may be an appealing approach for dual-use industry, given the diversity of industries that fall into this category. Participants developing the standard could come from a range of industries to ensure it is comprehensive. This standard may not be a certification standard, but it could still be helpful in encouraging industry to take a more proactive stance on combating black market activities.
As mentioned with respect to the nuclear industry, a number of companies could serve as potential participants and advocates of the self-regulation approach. While it is not clear as to what specific companies would be best to initiate the process, the companies that manufacture and sell trigger-list nuclear items and that have requested a license for their export could serve as the potential proponents of the self-regulation model. The following list is of companies that have requested such a license from the NRC is the last couple of years. They would likely be a good group with whom to initiate discussions. The NGO, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), has been advocating improved global physical security of weapons-usable nuclear materials. Charles Curtis from NTI made a presentation at the recent INMM annual meeting (July 11, 2005) on "promoting global best
Page 12 practices" focusing on the physical security of nuclear materials. 20 He challenged industry to formulate best practices for safeguarding nuclear materials, to communicate them broadly, and put them into practice worldwide. He proposed INMM as a possible vehicle to developing an organization to promote voluntarily measures to improve nuclear materials security.
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The proposal here is to combine physical security of materials at industries' facilities with better export controls. INMM is a professional society, not a company membership organization, and therefore may lack the strong operational practice necessary to serve as a stand-alone organization for promoting this self-regulation. It may be a good advocate, however, for creating some type of entity to assume this mission. The World Nuclear Association (WNA) is an alternative organization, but based on industry representative feedback from some discussions during WNA's annual conference this year 22 , nonproliferation is likely outside of its mission. The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) is another industry organization. However, Mr. Lucas Mampaey, WANO's Managing Director, responded at the WNA annual meeting that broadening his organization's mission from safety to include security would be a stretch. He saw the need for industry to promote nonproliferation, but could not identify the most appropriate industry entity to take the lead. 23 Industry leaders with an interest in export control and physical protection of materials at their facilities may need to take the initiative to establish some type of program. 24 A new industry NGO could potentially grow out of this initiative. Again, partnerships could be formed with government entities to ensure that the program is robust. Smaller, industryworking groups also could be approached to determine their interest. For example, in terms of the physical security of materials component, nuclear power reactor Owners Groups could be approached. Soliciting input from individuals representing organizations with a broad perspective along with individuals with a "working on-the-ground-level" perspective would likely improve the framing of an industry organization that would best meet the needs to ensure that goods and services are well controlled and managed to combat black market activities. Uniting to exchange operating experience in a culture of openness, so members can work together to achieve the highest possible standards of nuclear safety.
The culture of openness allows each operator to benefit and learn from others' experiences, challenges and best practice, with the ultimate goal of improving nuclear plant safety, reliability and performance levels for the benefit of their customers throughout the world.
There is an INPO/DOE contract where DOE has access to certain INPO products and services 
World Nuclear Association
To inform public debate about energy needs and how nuclear power needs to be increased given climate change issues.
To provide information services to m embers, policymakers, the media and the public.
Note mentioned on the website, but likely post Chernobyl as well.
NGO
WNA has 'Independent Affiliates' comprise diverse nuclear-related organizations partnered with WNA. These are:
professional organizations with an international membership and a specific focus of interest;
• national or regional commercially-based membership organizations;
• national nuclear societies; and
• citizens' organizations supporting nuclear power as a key clean energy option.
United voice working towards increasing nuclear power operations worldwide.
To share information and develop analysis on a range of technical, trade and environmental matters. These subjects include:
• nuclear fuel production and industry economics • nuclear trade issues • radiological protection • 'nuclear event' definition • transport • waste management and decommissioning.
WNA Charter of Ethics*:
Principles: "Our strong support for the work performed -By governments, through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to promulgate nuclear safety standards for the worldwide nuclear industry and to ensure that there has been no spread of nuclear weapons arising from the civil nuclear fuel cycle.
The WNA is concerned with nuclear power generation and all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including mining, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, plant manufacture, transport, and the safe disposition of spent fuel.
On the public website, the Secretariat's aim is to maintain the best available non-technical source of information on the global nuclear industry.
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* From the WNA Charter of Ethics
The WNA calls for its member participants to abide by the following principles:
• International Legal Obligations -"Our individual and common responsibility to uphold respective international legal commitments embodied in - 
